In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters' interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians also liable for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.
Introduction
As noted by Seabright (1996) , political constitutions are incomplete contracts that leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, voters can discipline politicians by threatening to vote them out of office if they abuse their power and reward good politicians by reelecting them. The general purpose of this paper is to address voters' ability to discipline politicians when there are two levels of government and when the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the incumbent at the other.
In countries with multi-tiered governments, decisions made by one level of government often affect governments at other levels. Tax bases commonly overlap and responsibilities can intersect or be closely related.
Examples of the latter are shared responsibilities for redistribution, infrastructure, and environmental protection between, for example, federal and state governments in the United States. In such situations, voters may be unable to accurately distinguish the consequences of the decisions made by one level of government from the consequences of decisions made by the other. In addition, when governments are affected by each others' decisions, it is often reasonable to assume that one level of government acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the other. The relative size of the governments is one reason why a higher level of government is commonly assumed to act as a Stackelberg leader relative to lower-level governments (Keen and Kotsogiannis 2003) . It is also possible that a lower-level government might become a Stackelberg leader relative a higher-level government, when the higher-level government is relatively weak (e.g., because the lower-level government already had commitments to certain policies when the higher level was formed). One example is that of the individual member states of the European Union, which often are considered to be Stackelberg leaders relative to the federal level (e.g., Caplan and Silva 1999; Aronsson, Jonsson, and Sjögren 2006) . One level of government might also become a Stackelberg leader because of constitutional requirements that it decide on its budget before the other level of government does. Another example is that a government might get a Stackelberg role if it has to sign legal binding contracts on procurements and thereby commit to certain expenditures. In this paper, the higher-level government is treated as a Stackelberg leader relative to the lower-level government, but, as discussed below, the results apply equally well to situations where the roles are reversed.
In the model presented in this paper, the two levels of government each provide one good and finance their expenditures with taxes. The goods are inputs in a production function and voters observe the output, but are generally assumed not to observe the input levels. The latter assumption is made to mimic situations where voters are unable to accurately distinguish between the efforts of different governments.
The governments are assumed to be controlled by politicians motivated solely by self-interest who choose their policies to maximize the discounted value of their rents. This Leviathan view of politicians may not perfectly depict reality, but as long as politicians -like other humans -are partly driven by self-interest, this assumption allows us to study some interesting aspects of voters' electoral control. To focus on moral hazard, I neglect adverse selection issues by assuming that all politicians are identical.
The source of the rents is the fact that political constitutions are incomplete contracts, meaning that politicians in power can choose policies with discretion.
1 To make selfish politicians restrain from Leviathan policies, voters allow them rents while in office and promise them reelection if they behave. These rents, which can be resources politicians divert to their private consumption, more broadly capture conflict of interests between voters and their representatives; for example, voters may favor a different composition of government spending than politicians.
One might ask whether politicians trying to divert rent is an important problem in reality, especially in stable democracies. Even if we observe cases where politicians clearly attempt to enrich themselves at the cost of the public -one example being the recent expense scandal in the British Parliament -the magnitudes of rents may not appear to be a major problem in democracies. One possible explanation for this is that repeated elections have a disciplining effect, in line with the analysis in this and related papers.
This paper relates to Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) and even closer to Wrede (2002) , who analyzed the behavior of selfish politicians in countries with two government bodies and compared the outcomes to those of unitary countries. While Persson et al. (1997) looked at the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government and focused on the role of checks and balances in, for example, budget processes, Wrede, as I do, studied the separation of powers between levels of government and focused on the effects of different voting strategies, but assumed that the incumbents act as Nash competitors towards each other. Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) found that when two government bodies can commit resources without requiring approval from each other, the total political rent is higher than with only one government body. Another of Wrede's main findings is that voters can strengthen their power by introducing reciprocal liability, which reduces the independence of the governments, but that there is a risk of reciprocal liability leading to permanent Leviathan policy. Reciprocal liability is created by letting the incumbents' reelection probabilities also depend on the decisions of their counterparts at the other level of government.
The results of this paper indicate that the total tax rate is higher with two government bodies than with one. This is because the total political rent is higher with two government bodies -as demonstrated previously by Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) -and because voters will want to reduce public consumption by less than one unit when total rent is increased by one unit. The results also demonstrate that, with two government bodies, voters can reduce the resources diverted to political rents by increasing the beneficial public expenditures they require for reelecting incumbents. This means that, for a given level of the total political rent, voters will choose higher public expenditures and thus higher taxes, which increases the difference between the total tax rate in two-and one-government countries.
Other novel results depend on the assumption of Stackelberg leadership: among other matters, these results describe differences in voters' marginal cost of expenditures by the Stackelberg leader and expenditures by the follower, and how voters are affected if the Stackelberg leader is able to give an intergovernmental 1 One reason as to why constitutions are incomplete contract is that some information needed for efficient contracts are lacking or not verifiable, implying that politicians cannot be held legally responsible for some of their actions (Seabright 1996) . Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) demonstrated that information asymmetries concerning the state of nature can also be a source of rents. In the model used in the present paper, however, there is no such uncertainty.
transfer to the follower. In addition, unlike the situation described by Wrede (2002) , the results show that, with Stackelberg leadership, there is no risk of reciprocal liability leading to permanent Leviathan policy.
Three retrospective voting strategies are considered in the present paper. Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) demonstrated theoretically that voters can prevent governments from myopically behaving as Leviathans by using retrospective voting strategies. Many scholars have also found empirical support for voters employing retrospective voting strategies and for this affecting incumbents' decisions (e.g., Besley
and Case 1995; Lewis-Beck 1998).
Like Wrede, I consider one voting strategy with full reciprocal liability, meaning that voters reelect either the incumbents at both levels or none of the incumbents, and contrast this solution to that obtained when voters evaluate the performance of both incumbents entirely separately. Besides these two extreme strategies, I also consider a voting strategy with partial reciprocal liability. Here, voters are assumed to hold incumbents at both levels jointly responsible for the output produced, but not to hold the incumbent at each level responsible for the tax determined and collected by the incumbent at the other level. When voters have too little information to evaluate politicians separately, for example, because the division of responsibilities between levels of government is unclear to the voters, some degree of reciprocal liability is unavoidable. For example, in Sweden, where local governments provide basic care to the elderly while regional governments are responsible for providing more advanced medical care, voters apparently sometimes do not know which politicians to blame when healthcare to the elderly is deemed inadequate, and some voters therefore employ voting strategies with partial reciprocal liability.
In the next section, I set up the model and analyze the benchmark policy decisions of voters and the incumbent in a unitary country. Section 3 presents the solutions achieved using the different voting strategies in a two-tiered-government country. First, the voting strategy with no reciprocal liability is analyzed (subsection 3.1), then that with partial reciprocal liability (subsection 3.2), and finally that with full reciprocal liability (subsection 3.3). In section 4, I discuss how voters are affected if the Stackelberg leader is able to give an intergovernmental transfer to the incumbent at the other level. Finally, section 5 presents the paper's conclusions.
The model and the unitary state benchmark
An infinite series of independent periods is considered. Since the conditions in all periods are the same, no time index is used. The federation consists of two levels of government, called the federal and state levels.
Following Wrede (2002) , horizontal divisions of the country are neglected to focus on the common-pool problem, which arises when a government body can independently commit public expenditures without requiring approval from other government bodies.
The instantaneous utility function of the voters is written U = u(c)+ϕ(q), where c is private consumption and q is the output produced by the publicly provided inputs. Preferences are identical and both sub-utility functions are increasing in their arguments and strictly concave. Assuming identical preferences allows us to neglect that elections also serve to aggregate preferences, albeit always imperfectly. Input y is assumed to be provided exclusively by the state government and Y is assumed to be exclusively provided by the federal government. These assumptions are made to focus on a situation when voters have difficulties separating the actions of two levels of government. For simplicity, the units are chosen so that the unit costs of y and Y are both 1.
Each level of government is assumed to finance its expenditures using a tax and to balance its budget in each period. For simplicity, I follow Persson et al. (1997) by assuming that the tax base is exogenously given and normalize it to one.
2 Individuals have no access to capital markets, so they consume all their income. The individuals' budget constraint can thus be written 1 − t − T = c, where t and T are the tax rates imposed by the state and federal governments, respectively.
The politicians are assumed to be infinitely lived and to choose their policies to maximize the discounted value of their rents. Ferejohn (1986) provides one rationale for assuming infinitely lived politicians, namely, that competitors for office can be thought of as political parties that last indefinitely and manage to solve their internal incentive problems.
Voters are assumed to employ simple retrospective voting strategies based on cutoff levels for the tax rates and the output (or on y and Y ) and are assumed never to reelect politicians who are voted out of office.
3 Following Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) , I restrict the analysis to strategies based on the outcomes in the current period and not in any previous period. The advantage of such strategies is that they are simple enough to be plausible; as noted by Persson et al. (1997) , such voting strategies can be seen as a simple convention adopted by voters and suggested by social norms. In addition, in this model, where there is no uncertainty regarding the state of the economy and where all politicians are identical, voters would not benefit from basing their strategies on outcomes in previous periods.
The solution in a unitary country
In a unitary country, both public goods are provided by a central government, that finances its expenditures using a single rate, τ . At the start of each period, p, the voters determine cutoff levels τ 0 and q 0 and announce that they will reelect the incumbent if and only if τ ≤ τ 0 and q ≥ q 0 ; since c = (1 − τ), this is equivalent to determining cutoff levels for c and q. Next, the incumbent government makes its expenditure and tax decisions, knowing the voting rule. At the end of the period, the voters observe τ and q and determine whether to reelect the incumbent government according to the announced voting rule. Following Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) , I assume that voters are able to commit to voting rules. This is not a strong assumption: since all politicians are identical, voters are indifferent as to whether to reelect the incumbent government or elect an opposition, meaning that there is no cost to the voters associated with ousting politicians who do not meet the required cutoff levels.
The selfish incumbent's objective is to maximize the discounted value of all rents he will obtain. An incumbent who seeks reelection will choose y and Y to maximize his rents, χ, subject to τ ≤ τ 0 , q ≥ q 0 , and the budget constraint τ − y − Y = χ. The incumbent will never set τ below τ 0 and never spend more on the inputs than necessary to exactly achieve q 0 . Thus, the incumbent's optimization problem can be simplified to
Letting λ denote the Lagrangian multiplier, the first-order conditions are written
This tells us that the incumbent will choose an input combination where the marginal products of y and Y are equal, meaning that the output will be produced efficiently.
An incumbent who chooses to maximize immediate payoffs instead of fulfilling the reelection criteria would set τ = 1, y = Y = 0 and obtain a payoff of 1. Since the incumbent would never be reelected by pursuing this tactic, it also follows that the discounted value of all payoffs to the incumbent would amount to 1. I assume that incumbents deviate from the proposed policy only if the present value of their rents thereby becomes strictly higher. To ensure that an incumbent adheres to the proposed policy, voters therefore set τ 0 and q 0 so that the present value of the rents that an incumbent staying in office is guaranteed also amounts to 1. Since all periods are identical, this means that an incumbent in each period must be given a rent of
The voters will choose cutoff levels of τ 0 and q 0 so that the marginal utility of private consumption equals the marginal utilities of each publicly provided good, i.e., so that u = ϕ ∂q ∂y = ϕ ∂q ∂Y . Also the solution obtained when benevolent politicians in a unitary state choose τ , y, and Y is characterized by u = ϕ ∂q ∂y = ϕ ∂q ∂Y , but since no resources are diverted to rents, the marginal utilities are lower in that 4 Note that the rent would be higher if the government could borrow, but lower if it were unable to collect all resources in the economy as taxes. The results of this paper would remain unchanged if the government could collect only a given fraction of the resources or if it could run up deficits, unless it could borrow so much that all resources in the economy were diverted to rents. situation. 5 In other words, both private consumption and input levels are lower when politicians divert rents, while the tax rate is higher.
Solutions in the case of a two-tier government
The federal incumbent is assumed to make its decisions before -and is treated as a Stackelberg leader relative to -the state incumbent. Since horizontal divisions of the country are neglected, this is the only principal difference between the two levels of government, meaning that the model can also be used to understand situations where the state incumbent acts as a Stackelberg leader. To highlight the principal difference between the situations for the two incumbents, in the following I call the state incumbent the "follower" and the federal incumbent the "leader".
Following Wrede (2002) , I assume that incumbents at both levels do not cooperate, that they maximize the discounted value of their rents, and that they have the same discount factor as the incumbent in the unitary nation. When voters determine separate cutoff levels for the two tax rates, both are assumed to be strictly below 1/2. Still, if the incumbents deviate from the proposed policies, we cannot rule out that the sum of the tax rates exceeds 1. Since the sum of the governments' tax revenues cannot exceed the tax base, which equals 1, I follow Persson et al. (1997) by assuming that if the total tax rate exceeds 1, the governments obtain tax revenues equal to 1/2 each. That is, the maximum tax revenues to the state and federal governments are r = max{1 − T, 1/2} and R = max{1 − t, 1/2}, respectively.
Voting strategy 1, observable inputs and no reciprocal liability
When one incumbent is responsible for providing y while another is responsible for providing Y , it may matter whether the levels of y and Y are observable to the voters. To study this, the solution that would occur if voters observed y and Y and used this information to evaluate the incumbents separately is described in this subsection. In the following two subsections, solutions obtained when y and Y are unobservable to the voters are compared with this solution.
Under strategy 1, voters at the start of each period determine cutoff levels t 1 , T 1 , y 1 and Y 1 and announce that they will reelect the follower if and only if t ≤ t 1 and y ≥ y 1 and the leader if and only if T ≤ T 1 and Y ≥ Y 1 . Next, the leader makes his expenditure and tax decisions, taking into account the possible reactions of the follower. Thereafter, the follower makes his expenditure and tax decisions, and at the end of the period the voters observe t, T , y, and Y and determine whether to reelect the politicians according to the announced voting rules.
The follower will either deviate from the proposed policy by choosing t = r and y = 0 or seek reelection by choosing t = t 1 and y = y 1 . 6 If the follower would deviate, his payoff would equal r = max{1 − T, 1/2}.
5 See Appendix A for the derivation of these results. 6 To be exact, if the follower deviates when T ≥ 1/2, it does not matter what tax rate the follower chooses as long as it is at least 1/2. Therefore, the follower will seek reelection if and only if the discounted value of the rents he is allowed per period in office, x 1 , is at least at large as r; that is, if
Condition (1) indicates that the follower will be more likely to seek reelection the lower is y 1 , the higher is t 1 and -for values of T below 1/2 -the higher is T .
The situation of the leader is essentially the same as that of the follower. The leader can deviate from the proposed policy by choosing T = R and Y = 0 and would then obtain a payoff of R = max{1 − t, 1/2}.
Therefore, the leader will seek reelection if and only if the discounted value of the rents he is allowed per period in office, X 1 , is at least at large as R, that is, if
Condition (2) indicates that the leader will be more likely to seek reelection the lower is Y 1 , the higher is T 1 and -for values of t below 1/2 -the higher is t.
In the equilibrium, the voters will determine the rents so that none of the incumbents prefers to deviate,
The rents can therefore be written as
Solving for x 1 and X 1 gives
and
Under this strategy, the follower will not react to the leader's decisions. For Y = Y 1 and T = T 1 , the follower will obtain the same discounted rents by fulfilling the reelection criteria as by deviating from them, and will then, by assumption, fulfill the reelection criteria. If the leader, for some unfathomable reason, would deviate, the payoff the follower could obtain by deviating would be reduced, meaning that he would strongly prefer to seek reelection. That the follower does not react to the leader's decisions under this strategy means that the game effectively becomes a Nash game, even though the leader makes decisions first, and the equilibrium can be described as a stable and unique Nash equilibrium.
Equations (3) and (4) tell us that the total political rent is larger under strategy 1 than in the unitary country. Since t 1 = y 1 + x 1 < 1/2 and T 1 = Y 1 + X 1 < 1/2, by assumption, equations (3) and (4) indicate that both x 1 and X 1 are strictly greater than χ 0 /2, which means that X T ot 1
7 Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) derived corresponding results. While the model here differs quite significantly from theirs, a feature common to all three models is that the government bodies can commit resources without requiring approval from each other. 8 This is known as a common-pool problem. That the total political rent is larger in such settings is because the incumbents are able to deviate independently and could therefore secure an immediate payoff larger than half the tax base. To avoid a Leviathan policy, voters have to guarantee political rents based on these "fallback payoffs", meaning that the total rent in the two-tier-government country must be allowed to be larger than in the unitary country. 9 That the total political rent is larger under strategy 1 means that voters are more strongly restricted than voters in the unitary country, since the total political rent is larger under strategy 1. This makes the voters worse off;
that is, their utility is reduced.
Proposition 1 contains results describing the voters' incentives regarding their public expenditure choices, and the consequences of these for the total tax rate. Before turning to the proposition, let us define voters' marginal cost of public expenditures as the reduction in private consumption that voters have to accept in order to increase public expenditures by one unit.
Proposition 1 Under strategy 1, (a) voters' marginal cost of public expenditures is below unity, and (b) the output is produced efficiently. 
is defined as in equation (7). The first-order conditions then become
The expressions in square brackets describe how much voters will have to reduce their private consumption to increase beneficial public expenditures by one unit. In other words, 1 − 1−δ 2−δ is the voters' marginal cost of public expenditures and, since δ < 1, it is below unity, which proves (a). This result is explained by the fact that the incumbents' payoffs from deviating unilaterally, and thus their rents, depend on each others' tax rate. When beneficial public expenditures are increased, the tax rates must be increased as well. This reduces the payoffs of deviating unilaterally, so the rents can also be reduced. That voters' marginal cost of 7 An alternative proof is that equation (7) indicates that X T ot 1 > χ 0 , if and only if y 1 + Y 1 < δ. Note that t 1 + T 1 < 1
can only be below one if y 1 + Y 1 < δ. 8 Persson et al. (1997) also demonstrated that separation of powers between government bodies can be beneficial to voters if both bodies are required to agree on public policy. 9 The discussion here draws on Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002 , which demonstrates that the voters choose an efficient input combination with y 1 = Y 1 . Result (b) is a consequence of the total rent being reduced equally if voters increases y 1 or Y 1 , implying that the marginal cost of both inputs to the voters are the same. Equations (5) and (6) indicate that when y 1 = Y 1 , x 1 = X 1 , which in turns means that t 1 = T 1 ; that is, the equilibrium under strategy 1 is symmetric.
Voting strategy 2, partial reciprocal liability
Here, I return to the assumption that y and Y are unobservable to the voters and therefore let the voters determine one cutoff level for q, instead of separate cutoff levels for Y and y. Thus, under strategy 2, the voters will reelect the follower if and only if t ≤ t 2 and q ≥ q 2 , and the leader if and only if T ≤ T 2 and q ≥ q 2 . The rents under this strategy are denoted x 2 and X 2 .
The follower will either deviate from the proposed policy by choosing t = r and y = 0 or seek reelection by choosing t = t 2 and y = y i 2 , where y i 2 denotes the minimum value of y required to achieve q 2 for Y = Y i 2 . If the follower would deviate, his payoff would be r = max{1 − T, 1/2}. Therefore, the follower will seek reelection if and only if the discounted value of the rents he is allowed is at least at large as r, that is, if
Condition (10) indicates that the follower will be more likely to seek reelection the lower is q 2 , the higher are Y i 2 and t 2 and -for values of T below 1/2 -the higher is T . Thus, for the follower, the decision context itself is unaffected by the changed strategy. He still observes the leader's decisions before making his own and will still require a rent of r(1 − δ) to seek reelection. The value of this required rent, however, is affected by a changed decision context for the leader; unlike x 1 , x 2 is directly affected by the leader's decisions, since y 
subject to the budget constraint
the voting rule (T 2 , q 2 ), and the follower's reactions.
If the leader seeks reelection, he prefers that the follower also seek reelection, since the value of Y required to achieve q 2 is decreasing in y. The leader would therefore set T = T 2 and Y = Y I 2 , where Y I 2 is 1 0 We cannot generally conclude whether the voters' marginal cost for public expenditures would be below or above unity if the tax base were endogenous, since we then would have a counteracting effect. We can, however, conclude that, also with an endogenous tax base, voters' marginal cost for public expenditures would be lower with two levels of government than with one. The reason for this is the same as that for the exogenous tax base discussed above.
the minimum value of Y for which the follower also seeks reelection: so that t 2 −y
Note that Y I 2 (q 2 , t 2 , T ) is increasing in q 2 , but decreasing in t 2 and T since the follower is prepared to increase y when tax rates are increased. This is because a higher t 2 increases the follower's rent for a given y I 2 , and because a higher T reduces the follower's payoff from deviating.
If the leader does not seek reelection, for reasonable values of δ and q 2 he would still prefer that the follower seeks reelection: if both deviate from the voting rule, both obtain a payoff equal to 1/2, but if only the leader deviates, he could obtain a payoff exceeding 1/2. To induce the follower to seek reelection, the leader will set Y such that the maximum amount the follower is prepared to spend on his input is just enough to achieve q 2 . Let us call these values of Y and y for Y This means that the leader will seek reelection if and only if
Rational voters will set t 2 , T 2 , and q 2 so that both incumbents seek reelection. Using that r in (10) then equals 1 − Y I 2 − X 2 and substituting for X 2 , the rents can be written
Note the asymmetry between (12) and (13): the leader's rent is affected by the total expenditures required to achieve q 2 if he deviates, while the follower's rent is affected, besides the rent to the leader, by only Y I 2 . Proposition 2 describes the equilibrium under strategy 2 and compares it with the equilibrium under strategy 1.
Proposition 2 Under strategy 2, (a) voters' marginal cost of public expenditures is below unity, (b) the output is produced inefficiently, and (c) voters are better off than under strategy 1.
voters increase the beneficial public expenditures by increasing the cutoff levels, the payoff from deviating unilaterally, and thus the required rents, is reduced. This means that the voters' marginal costs of y Voters have enough instruments to choose efficient input mixes: they can, for example, reduce Y and increase y by reducing T and increasing t. Despite this, voters will choose an inefficient input combination to reduce the total political rent. This result stems from two characteristics of the model: (i) that one incumbent acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the other and (ii) that the Stackelberg leader's decisions will affect whether the follower is reelected.
To prove (c), it is helpful to use that y II 2 + (1 − δ)/2 = y I 2 + x 2 = t 2 , which allows the rents to be written as
Comparing (17) with (7), we see that for given levels of y and Y the total political rent under strategy 2 is less than under strategy 1, since Y II 2 > 0. This means that voters are less restricted under strategy 2 and thus obtain a higher utility.
That voters are worse off under strategy 1 than under strategy 2 might seem surprising, since they had more information under strategy 1. The explanation, of course, is not the difference in information itself, but that voters were assumed to use their additional information under strategy 1 to evaluate the incumbents separately. As Wrede (2002) demonstrated, it may be in the voters' interests to enforce reciprocal liability, which is created when the reelection probabilities of both incumbents also depend on each others' policies.
Basing the reelection decision on q, instead of on y and Y , in fact induces reciprocal liability, even though stronger forms of reciprocal liability are possible. The reason why voters are better off if they enforce reciprocal liability is that this reduces the leader's possibility to deviate unilaterally and thus the payoff he would obtain by deviating. This, in turn, means that the rent that voters must guarantee the leader can be reduced. For given levels of y and Y , the follower's rent must be increased by (1 − δ) times the reduction in the leader's rent, meaning that the total political rent is reduced by δ times the reduction in the leader's rent. Thus, voters benefit from enforcing reciprocal liability.
Sufficient conditions for voters to choose cutoff values so that the total political rent is indeed lower here than under strategy 1 are that voters' marginal costs of y and Y are lower (or equally high) under strategy 2 than under strategy 1. Appendix D proves that the condition for Y holds. This is because an increase in Y I 2 not only reduces x 2 , but also reduces X 2 , since a higher Y I 2 means higher q 2 for a given y I 2 and thus a higher Y II 2 (see equations 12 and 13). Appendix D demonstrates that the voters' marginal cost of y will be lower under strategy 2 than under strategy 1, if the production function is not too flat with respect to y and if the discount factor is not too low; more precisely if
Voters will both spend more on private consumption and require higher public expenditures if the total required rent is reduced, all else being equal. Thus, if X T ot 2 ≤ X
T ot 1
and if voters' marginal cost also of y is indeed lower under strategy 2, voters will choose higher public expenditures than under strategy 1. Since (17) and (7) tell us that X T ot 2
< X
T ot 1
1 . Therefore, if voters' marginal cost of y is also lower (or equally high) under strategy 2 than under strategy 1, voters will require higher public expenditures under strategy 2 and the total political rent will be lower than under strategy 1.
One might ask whether the leader benefits from being a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other incumbent. Often, being a Stackelberg leader is advantageous, but in some situations it is a disadvantage to be forced to show one's cards before the other player determines his strategy. Let us start by considering whether the leader is better off than the follower. Comparing equations (15) and (16), we see that y works for x 2 < X 2 , but that Y II 2 has a counteracting effect. Equations (15) and (16) give
Equation ( , which may or may not be true. Thus, the leader does not necessarily obtain a higher rent than the follower does. This also means that the leader can actually obtain a lower rent than he would if the two incumbents instead acted as Nash competitors towards each other. Then, both incumbents would obtain rents equal to the rents under strategy 1. If, as seems likely, the total rent is lower under strategy 2 than under strategy 1, a necessary condition for X 2 not to fall below X 1 is that the leader obtain a higher share of the total rent under strategy 2, but as just demonstrated, this is not necessarily the case. That the leader's rent can fall below the one he would obtain in the Nash equilibrium is, of course, not explained by his ability to influence the follower, but by that he is assumed to make its decision before the follower. This means that the leader can not choose to simultaneously with the follower decide whether to deviate; in other words, the leader can not choose the Nash strategy.
Voting strategy 3, full reciprocal liability
Let us now consider full reciprocal liability, meaning that voters follow strategy 3 and reelect both incumbents if t 3 + T 3 ≤ τ 3 and q 3 ≥ q 3 , and reelect none if either of these conditions is not fulfilled. Thus, under this strategy the incumbents are liable for each others' expenditure decisions, as under strategy 2, and also for each others' tax decisions. The rents under this strategy are denoted x 3 and X 3 , and t 3 , T 3 , y 3 , and Y 3 denote the levels of taxes and expenditures determined by the incumbents.
As under strategies 1 and 2, the follower can deviate from the proposed policy by setting t = r and y = 0, which would give a payoff of r = max{1 − T, 1/2}. The follower will therefore seek reelection if and only if
where
3 ) denotes the minimum value of y required to achieve q 3 for Y = Y i 3 . Leaders seeking reelection had no choice under strategy 1, but under strategy 2 they chose Y I 2 to maximize their rents. Under strategy 3, a leader seeking reelection chooses T 3 and Y 3 to maximize his rents,
the voting rule. The first-order conditions become
where λ 3 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier for the follower's selection constraint and where
∂q/∂y3 . Full reciprocal liability eliminates the leader's possibility to deviate independently: if the leader chooses a higher tax or lower expenditures than is in accordance with the follower's selection constraint, it is in the follower's interests to maximize his immediate payoff. Both incumbents will then obtain a payoff of 1/2. Therefore, it is sufficient that the voters guarantee the leader a rent of X 3 = (1 − δ)/2. Rational voters choose τ 3 and q 3 so that both incumbents seek reelection. Thus, the rents can be written
When writing the leader's optimization problem and the expression for x 3 above, I used that T 3 must be strictly below 1/2 since τ 3 < 1. To understand why, note that in a situation where the leader chooses between values of T 3 above 1/2, x 3 would equal (1 − δ)/2 and the follower's selection constraint would read
The first-order condition for T 3 would then become 1 − λ 3 = 0, which, combined with equation (21), would give ∂y 3v ∂Y3v = 1 and y 3 = Y 3 . With x 3 = X 3 = (1 − δ)/2, this means that t 3 = T 3 , but this is impossible when T 3 ≥ 1/2, given that τ 3 < 1, which proves that T 3 < 1/2.
Looking at (23) and (22), we see that x 3 > X 3 , since T 3 = Y 3 + (1 − δ)/2 < 1/2. Actually, X 3 is less than the rent the leader would obtain if the two incumbents acted as Nash competitors towards each other: then the leader would obtain a rent equal to what he obtained under strategy 1, X 1 = (1 − y 1 − x 1 )(1 − δ), which is above 1/2 since t 1 = y 1 + x 1 < 1/2. Thus, under full reciprocal liability an incumbent is clearly hurt by having to make its decisions before the other incumbent.
Proposition 3 describes the equilibrium under strategy 3 and compares it with the equilibriums under strategies 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 Under strategy 3, (a) voters' marginal cost of public expenditures of the leader is below unity, while their cost for public expenditures of the follower is unity, (b) the output is produced inefficiently, and (c) the voters are better off than under strategies 1 or 2.
To prove (a), note that voters' marginal cost of public expenditures are one, plus the effect that a marginal increase in the expenditures has on the total political rent, described in (24). Therefore, we see that the voters' marginal cost is δ for Y , but that it is unity for y, since the leader's payoff from deviating is fixed at (1 − δ)/2 and hence unaffected by the follower's tax and expenditure decisions.
Result (b) is proved by combining the leader's first-order conditions, (20) and (21). This gives δ = ∂q/∂Y3 ∂q/∂y3 , which demonstrates that the leader chooses T 3 and Y 3 so that y 3 > Y 3 . By choosing this inefficient input combination, the leader reduces the payoff that the follower could obtain by deviating, and thus the rents he must be given. Note that while the inefficient input combination was chosen by the voters under strategy 2, it is chosen by the leader under strategy 3. This difference is because two policy variables are generally insufficient to enable voters to choose the input combination they prefer. However, that voters' marginal cost of public expenditures are δ for Y and unity for y implies that they, like the leader, prefer an input combination described by δ = ∂q/∂Y3 ∂q/∂y3 . That the leader's and the voters' interests coincide in this matter is because y and Y do not affect the leader's payoff from deviating under full reciprocal liability. Thus, both the leader's and voters' preferences concerning input combinations are results of the same wish to minimize the sum of x 3 , y, and Y , for a given level of q 3 .
That the leader and voters prefer the same input combination for a given level of q 3 means that the voters are not restricted by the fact that, under strategy 3, they are unable to choose the ratio y/Y , by choosing separate cutoff levels for t and T (or for y and Y ). In other words, under full reciprocal liability, it does not matter whether the voters decide on two, three or four cutoff levels; the important thing is that they reelect either none or both of the incumbents. The voters' marginal costs of public expenditures derived above is, however, arguably more interesting in with three or four cutoff levels, since the input combination is then a function of the voters' marginal costs.
To prove (c), first note that the leader is worse off under strategy 3 than under strategies 1 or 2, since both X 1 and X 2 are above (1 − δ)/2 (as discussed in previous subsections), while X 3 = (1 − δ)/2. In addition, note that under all three voting strategies, the follower's rent and the total political rent can be
X is reduced by one unit and Y is left unchanged, the total political rent is reduced by δ even though the follower's rent is increased by (1 − δ). This tells us that, for a fixed level of Y , the total political rent is lower under strategy 3 than under strategies 1 or 2. Since under all strategies voters can obtain the level of Y that they prefer, voters are less strongly restricted and better off under strategy 3 than under the other two strategies.
Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate that voters in an economic federation can strengthen their ability to discipline the incumbents by introducing partial reciprocal liability, and even more so by introducing full reciprocal liability. Still, total rents are higher than in the unitary country even under strategies 2 and 3. This is proved by the fact that the t 2 , T 2 , and T 3 are all below 1/2, which gives
and thus X T ot 2 > χ 0 , and x 3 > (1 − δ)/2 and thus X T ot 3 > χ 0 . An alternative assumption that would give
Since the total political rent is larger than in the unitary country, voters are more strongly restricted and therefore worse off than voters in the unitary country. Corollary 1 describes what implications this has for the total tax rates.
Corollary 1 Under strategies 1, 2, and 3, the total tax rates are higher than in the unitary country.
Corollary 1 is proved by that the total rents under all strategies are higher than in the unitary country and that public expenditures are reduced by less than one unit when the total political rent is increased by one unit. That voters' marginal costs of public expenditures are weakly lower with two government bodies than with one means that the public expenditures will be larger here for a given level of total political rent.
This means that with two government bodies the public expenditures could actually be as large as, or even larger than, those in the unitary country, despite more resources being diverted to political rent, and this increases the difference between the total tax rate here and in the unitary country.
Intergovernmental transfers
In this section, I briefly describe how voters are affected if the leader is able to give an intergovernmental transfer, s, to the follower. With the intergovernmental transfer, under all strategies, the leader will choose s, T , and Y to maximize
the voting rule, and the follower's reactions. Voters will take into account possible effects that the leader's new instrument has on the leader's and follower's decisions, when determining the cutoff values.
Proposition 4 describes how voters are affected if the leader is allowed to decide on an intergovernmental transfer that is allowed to be negative, meaning that the leader could demand a transfer from the follower.
Proposition 4 Under all strategies, voters are hurt if the leader is able to decide on a transfer that is allowed to be negative.
Proposition 4 is explained by that if the leader can demand a transfer from the follower, the leader is able to circumvent that he will access only half of the tax base directly if the total tax rate exceeds one. If the leader can secure the transfer if he deviates, the leader could, under all strategies, guarantee himself a payoff of unity by setting T ≥ 1 2 , s = − 1 2 , and Y = 0 and would therefore require a rent of 1 − δ not to do so. The increases in the leader's rent also imply increases in the total political rents under all strategies, which in turn means that voters become more restricted and hence worse off.
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Proposition 5 describes how voters are affected if the leader is allowed to decide on an intergovernmental transfer that is restricted to be nonnegative. To see (a), first note that under strategy 1, the leader has no incentive to transfer resources to the follower, since the incumbents are evaluated separately by the voters. Thus, the leader's opportunity to decide on a positive transfer does not change the outcome under this strategy.
Under strategy 3, the leader is able to distribute the total tax revenues τ 3 equally freely with and without s. What matters to the leader is T − s, not the individual level of T or s. Thus, under strategy 3, s is a superfluous instrument for the leader. This means that the levels of y, Y , x, and X will not be affected by the leader's ability to transfer resources either under strategy 3, which proves (a).
To see (b), note that if the cutoff levels are such that y . This would reduce the total expenditures required to fulfill q 2 , because of the concavity of the production function, without increasing the rent the follower requires, since the follower's payoff from deviating simultaneously with the leader is fixed at 1/2. This would increase the payoff the leader could obtain by deviating and thus the rent he requires not to deviate. This means that if the leader is able to transfer resources to the follower, the total political rent for the cutoff levels preferred by the voters without a transfer is increased, making the voters worse off.
Under strategy 2, voters would realize that with a transfer they cannot increase y II 2 + Y II 2 , for a given q 2 , by altering the input combination. The voters' only remaining reason to choose an inefficient input combination is then to contain the follower's rent. In Appendix E, I demonstrate that, as under strategy 3, voters will therefore choose an input combination described by δ = ∂q/∂Y ∂q/∂y . Still, the solutions under strategies 2 and 3 also differ with intergovernmental transfers, since the leader's rent is higher under strategy 2.
1 2 The leader could get a rent of 1 − δ even without a negative transfer if the rules were changed so that he would get the entire tax base if the total tax rate exceeds 1. Note that such a change would not imply that follower's rent would vanish, since the follower's rent is based on the payoff he can get by deviating, given that the leader has not deviated.
The reason why voters can be hurt by allowing the leader to transfer resources to the follower under strategy 2, but not under strategies 1 or 3, is that it is only under strategy 2 that both the leader and the voters can affect the leaders rent by altering the input combination: this can be done by the leader if s is allowed and y II 2 < Y II 2 when s = 0, and otherwise by the voters. To conclude, in the special cases where voters enforce no or full reciprocal liability, allowing the leader to decide on a positive intergovernmental transfer will not hurt the voters, but with partial reciprocal liability, this might increase the leader's rent and the total political rent and thus make the voters worse off. Under all strategies, allowing the leader to decide on a negative intergovernmental transfer will increase the leader's rent and the total political rent and thus leave the voters worse off.
Discussion
This paper addresses voters' ability to discipline selfish politicians. The focus is on a country with two levels of government, where the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to the incumbent at the other and where voters are unable to evaluate the performance of the incumbents separately. Simple retrospective voting strategies are considered.
As demonstrated previously by Persson et al. (1997) and Wrede (2002) , I found that, compared with a situation with only one government body, more resources are diverted to political rents and voters are worse off when two government bodies can commit resources independently. Since public expenditures are reduced by less than one unit when the total political rent is increased by one unit, the higher political rent also means that the total tax rate is higher in two-tier-government countries than in unitary countries.
The results of this paper also demonstrate that voters in two-tier-government countries have incentives to increase the beneficial public expenditures they require for reelecting incumbents, since this reduces the resources diverted to political rents. This incentive increases the differences between the total tax rates in two-tier-government countries and the tax rate in a unitary country.
As in Wrede (2002) , the present results demonstrate that voters can strengthen their power by introducing reciprocal liability; that is, also holding politicians accountable for the decisions of politicians at the other level of government. In fact, the present results provide stronger arguments for reciprocal liability than do those of Wrede. Unlike the situation described by Wrede, where incumbents act as Nash competitors towards each other, when one incumbent acts as a Stackelberg leader, permanent Leviathan policy is not a potential equilibrium even under full reciprocal liability. This difference between a Nash and a Stackelberg game is easily understood: given that cutoff levels are set appropriately, the Stackelberg leader can induce the other incumbent not to deviate from the proposed policy and, knowing this, will have an incentive not to deviate himself. In addition, unlike in a Nash game, in a Stackelberg game it is unnecessary that incumbents determine taxes and expenditures more than once in each term to obtain positive effects of a reciprocal-liability strategy: in a Nash game two decision occasions per term are needed for an incumbent to be able to react to decisions made by the other incumbent, but in a Stackelberg game, the follower will react to the leader's decision even though both incumbents only make tax and expenditure decisions once each term.
The results demonstrate that, with reciprocal liability, the voters' marginal cost of beneficial expenditures of the Stackelberg leader is lower than their marginal cost of beneficial expenditures of the follower. The reason is that when more resources are "tied up" by the Stackelberg leader, the follower requires lower rent not to deviate and take all the remaining resources. In addition, the results show that it is never in voters' interests to allow the Stackelberg leader to transfer resources to the follower. Without reciprocal liability, or with full reciprocal liability, the outcome will not be affected by the transfer as long as it is restricted to be weakly positive, but in the intermediate case with partial reciprocal liability, the outcome may be affected, making the voters worse off.
A policy implication of the results presented in this paper is that voters should strive for a situation where one level of government acts as a Stackelberg leader relative to another. Emerging democracies, or others forming new constitutions, can perhaps do this by requiring government bodies to decide on their budgets at different times. The results also imply that voters rather should expand the obligations for governments that act as Stackelberg leaders, than for governments acting as followers.
When voters are unable to evaluate the performance of the incumbents separately, some degree of reciprocal liability is unavoidable. One might argue that this can be seen as a positive effect of lack of transparency, since some voters likely do not realize the benefits of reciprocal liability. However, reciprocal These conditions indicate that voters will choose the cutoff levels so that the marginal utility of private consumption equals the marginal utility of each input.
In a unitary country, the only difference between the benevolent politicians' optimization problem and the voters' optimization problem with selfish politicians just described is that no resources are diverted to rents with benevolent politicians, meaning that the budget constraint becomes c = 1 − y − Y instead of
In subsection 3.2, it is demonstrated that y Note that since 0 < T 2 < 1/2, (1 − δ)/2 < x 2 = (1 − T 2 )(1 − δ) < (1 − δ). In addition, note that for
Clearly, this condition is more likely to be fulfilled the larger x 2 is, but note that even if x 2 would equal
(1 − δ), the condition will only be fulfilled if
C. Proof of Proposition 2 (a) and (b)
To obtain expressions for voters' marginal costs for public expenditures, it is helpful to analyze the voters' optimal choice of cutoff levels t 2 , T 2 , and q 2 . This could be done by maximizing the voters' utility with respect to these cutoff levels, but since the leader will choose Y I 2 so that the follower seeks reelection, the terms associated with the follower's budget constraint cancels out when the voters' optimization problem is solved in this manner. Therefore, it is more informative to solve the problem as if the voters directly chose 
Using that that q ≡ q 2 in the optimal solution, the first-order conditions can be written 
Using (12) and that t 2 = y -the minimum value of Y sufficient to achieve q 2 , given the maximum value of y that the follower is prepared to accept without deviating when the leader deviates -is increasing in q 2 , we know that (32) is negative and we therefore conclude that dt 2 dY I 2 < 0. The reason for this is that the follower's rent is reduced when Y I 2 is increased (even though it is affected positively by the reduction in the leader's rent) and that t 2 can therefore be reduced. Since 
E. Derivation of results regarding intergovernmental grants
With an intergovernmental transfer (called strategy 2i), y when s 2i = 0, since the leader can then offset marginal changes in t 2i by altering s 2i . The voters' first-order conditions (described in Appendix C for strategy 2) can thus be written 
Combining these conditions and rearranging shows that the solution is described by δ = ∂q/∂Y2i ∂q/∂y2i .
